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I. Introduction with 
some comparative 
remarks from a 
German perspective
1.  Article  9 of the Directive confers binding force on 
decisions of national competition authorities. For the 
purposes of an action for damages brought before a 
national court, an infringement of competition law 
found by a final decision of a national competition 
authority or by a review court is irrefutably established. 
This principle—laid down in the first paragraph of 
Article  9 of the Directive—is somewhat watered down 
by the second paragraph that concerns decisions taken 
in Member States other than the one where the court is 
seised. In this regard, the Directive requires that decisions 
can be presented as at least “prima facie evidence.” 
2. In its initial proposal, the European Commission had 
suggested a binding cross-border effect.1 This proposition 
was in particular inspired by Section 33(4) of the German 
Competition Act 2005, which reads as follows: “Where 
damages are claimed for an infringement of a provision 
of this Act or of Articles  101 or 102 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union, the court shall 
be bound by a finding that an infringement has occurred, 
to the extent that such a finding was made in a final and 
non-appealable decision by the competition authority, the 
European Commission, or the competition authority—or 
1 See Article 9 of  the Proposal for a Directive of  the European Parliament and of  the Council 
on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements 
of  the competition law provisions of  the Member States and of  the European Union, 
COM(2013) 404, 11.6.2013, p.  36 (“Member States shall ensure that, where national 
courts rule, in actions for damages under Article 101 or 102 of  the Treaty or under national 
competition law, on agreements, decisions or practices which are already the subject of  a final 
infringement decision by a national competition authority or by a review court, those courts 
cannot take decisions running counter to such finding of  an infringement.”).
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AbstrAct
Article 9 of the Damages Directive requires Member States to ensure that an 
infringement of competition law found by a final decision of a national competition 
authority is deemed to be irrefutably established for the purposes of an action 
for damages brought before their national courts. While some Member States 
considered decisions by a national competition authority as binding already before 
the Directive, there were a number of countries where these decisions established 
only a rebuttable presumption of an infringement. Referring to the application of 
article 9 of the Damages Directive, the Member States try to determine the binding 
effect within the Member State of the national authority, the binding effect in 
another Member State and the binding effect of EU Commission’s decisions.
En application de l’article 9 de la Directive 2014/104/UE, les Etats membres 
veillent à ce qu’une infraction au droit de la concurrence constatée par une 
décision définitive d’une autorité nationale de concurrence soit considérée comme 
établie de manière irréfutable aux fins d’une action en dommages et intérêts 
introduite devant leurs juridictions nationales. Bien que certains Etats membres 
aient considéré des décisions d’une autorité de concurrence nationale comme 
contraignantes déjà avant la Directive 2014/104/UE, il y a en a certains dans 
lesquels ces décisions n’ont établi qu’une présomption réfutable d’une infraction. 
Concernant l’application de l’article 9 de la Directive, les Etats membres essaient 
de déterminer l’effet contraignant dans l’Etat membre de l’autorité de concurrence 
nationale en question, l’effet contraignant dans un autre Etat membre et l’effet 
contraignant des décisions de la Commission européenne.
Binding effect of decisions 
of national authorities
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court acting as such—in another Member State of the 
European Union. The same applies to such findings in final 
and non-appealable judgments on appeals against decisions 
pursuant to sentence 1.”2 
3. In the course of the implementation of the Directive, it 
is now Section 33b of the German Competition Act 2017 
which contains an essentially identical provision with 
only negligible modifications to the wording. On the 
EU level, however, it appears that the idea of a cross-
border binding effect did not prevail due to doubts as to 
whether the administrative and court procedures in effect 
within all of the Member States sufficiently guarantee the 
fundamental rights of the defendants, as safeguarded, in 
particular, by Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU.3
4.  The binding effect as stipulated in Article  9 of the 
Directive covers both infringements of Articles  101 
and 102 TFEU and of national competition law, i.e., 
of “provisions (…) that predominantly pursue the same 
objective as Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and that are applied 
to the same case and in parallel to Union competition law 
pursuant to Article 3(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003.”4 
This latter aspect is not reflected in the text of Section 33b 
of the German Competition Act  2017 according to 
which the cross-border binding effect applies only to 
a finding of an infringement of Articles  101 and 102 
TFEU. A glance at the legislative materials reveals that 
the German legislator has recognised that the finding 
of an infringement of national competition law by a 
competition authority of another Member State must be 
considered prima facie evidence of the existence of such 
an infringement. Nevertheless, the legislator assumed that 
no legislative amendment was necessary in this regard.5 
On the one hand, it is true that the concept of prima facie 
evidence as such is well-established under German law, 
and thus the courts should indeed have less of a problem 
to construe German law in compliance with Article 9 of 
the Directive. However, on the other hand, the ECJ has 
consistently held that while a proper implementation of 
a directive does not necessarily require legislative action, 
the Member States have to ensure that “the legal position 
under national law should be sufficiently precise and clear 
and that individuals are made fully aware of their rights.”6 
2 The translation is taken from: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gwb/ 
index.html (last visited 11 June 2017).
3 See Report on the proposal for a directive of  the European Parliament and of  the Council 
on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements 
of  the competition law provisions of  the Member States and of  the European Union 
(COM(2013)0404 – C7-0170/2013 – 2013/0185(COD)), Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs, Rapporteur: Andreas Schwab, p. 79, where the following amendment 
to the Commission’s initial draft had been proposed: “This obligation is without prejudice 
(…) to the right to an effective remedy and a fair trial, and the right of  defence, pursuant to 
Articles 47 and 48 of  the Charter, and to the right to a fair hearing pursuant to Article 6 of  
the ECHR. Accordingly, decisions of  national competition authorities and competition courts 
shall be binding provided that there were no manifest errors in the investigation and provided 
that the rights of  the defence were complied with.”
4 See Article 2(1) and (3) of  the Directive.
5 Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 18/10207, 07.11.2016, Gesetzentwurf  der 
Bundesregierung, Entwurf  eines Neunten Gesetzes zur Änderung des Gesetzes gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, p. 56.
6 Case C-144/99, Commission v. Netherlands, ECLI:EU:C:2001:257, para. 17.
It is though not beyond doubt that the conditions of 
the doctrine of prima facie evidence as conventionally 
understood under German law are met with regard 
to the findings of competition authorities of another 
Member State. Thus, while the German courts have 
sufficient leeway to implement the Directive properly, 
it is in particular the Court’s last-mentioned condition 
that is not fulfilled under the law as it currently stands 
in Germany.
5.  In accordance with the general objective of the 
Directive “to regulate the coordination of [private and 
public] enforcement in a coherent manner,”7 the rationale 
of the binding effect pursuant to Article 9 is essentially 
twofold: consistency in the application of Articles  101 
and 102 TFEU and facilitating follow-on actions for 
damages.8 First, it should be avoided that the civil courts 
render judgments which run counter to (final) decisions 
of a national competition authority. Second, plaintiffs 
that bring a follow-on action for damages should be 
relieved of the difficulties to show an infringement of 
competition law. Thus, private plaintiffs will benefit from 
the investigatory powers of public authorities. 
6. The concept of facilitating follow-on damages claims 
by way of a binding effect of prior decisions on an 
infringement of competition law originates basically 
in US Federal Law and the ECJ’s case law. In the US, 
Section  5(a) of the Clayton Act provides that a “final 
judgment (…) rendered in any civil or criminal proceeding 
brought by (…) the United States (…) to the effect 
that a defendant has violated [the antitrust laws] shall 
be prima facie evidence against such defendant in any 
action or proceeding brought by any other party against 
such defendant.” The ECJ held in Masterfoods that the 
national courts must refrain from rendering a judgment 
that conflicts either with a prior decision or with a 
decision contemplated by the European Commission.9 
This rule has subsequently been codified in Article 16(1) 
of Regulation No. 1/2003. In Otis the ECJ confirmed 
that the rule applied “when national courts are hearing 
an action for damages for loss sustained as a result of an 
agreement or practice which has been found by a decision 
of the Commission to infringe Article  101 TFEU.”10 By 
establishing such a primacy of the Commission’s decisions 
over national courts, the ECJ first and foremost sought 
to guarantee a consistent application of EU competition 
law. But at the same time the court effectively released 
plaintiffs from the burden of demonstrating before a 
national court an infringement which the Commission 
has already found. 
7. Most Member States have considered decisions by a 
national competition authority as binding already before 
the Directive. However, there were a number of countries 
where these decisions established only a rebuttable 
7 Recital (6) of  the Directive.
8 See Recital (34) of  the Directive.
9 Case C-344/98, Masterfoods and HB, EU:C:2000:689, para. 51 et seq.
10 Case C-199/11, Otis and Others, EU:C:2012:684, para. 51. Ce
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presumption of an infringement or where they were 
regarded only as an element that judges could take into 
consideration.11 This reluctance to confer a binding effect 
on courts was for the most part motivated by concerns 
for the independence of judges and the protection of 
the due process rights. It is for that reason that also 
the extensive binding effect of Section 33(4) of the 
German Competition Act 2005 (now Section 33b of the 
Competition Act 2017) has not been without its critics. 
These concerns have been acknowledged in the literature 
in so far as the binding effect is widely considered to be 
limited in two respects: First, the person against whom 
the binding effect is invoked must have been involved 
in the competition authority’s proceedings. Bornkamm 
gives the example of a competition authority’s decision 
against a manufacturer practising a selective distribution 
system: if  a later damages claim is pursued against 
a distributor, the binding effect cannot be invoked if  
this distributor was not involved in the competition 
authority’s administrative proceedings.12 Second, it has 
been argued that the person against whom the binding 
effect is invoked must have the opportunity to show that 
the in the earlier proceedings leading up to the decision 
whose binding effect is in question that person’s due 
process rights were not adequately protected.13
8. Recital 34 of the Directive provides some guidance on 
the scope of the binding effect stipulating that it “cover[s] 
only the nature of the infringement and its material, 
personal, temporal and territorial scope as determined 
by the competition authority (…) in the exercise of its 
jurisdiction.” This statement seems to be consistent with 
the gist of the current practice in Germany though there 
are still some aspects that need clarifying. It was only 
recently that the Bundesgerichtshof (the German Federal 
Court of Justice) held that the binding effect relates 
to all findings in law and fact on which an authority’s 
decision that an infringement has occurred is based.14 As 
the establishment of an infringement as such does not 
require findings on a causal relationship between the 
infringement and harm done to others or on the amount 
of damage caused, the binding effect is—at least as a 
matter of principle—not relevant to these aspects, which 
are, however, essential for a successful follow-on action.15 
In particular, where a cartel authority includes findings 
on the inflicted harm in order to justify the amount of a 
fine imposed on a cartelist, these considerations are not 
11 See P. Buccirossi and M. Carpagnano, Is it Time for the European Union to Legislate in the 
Field of  Collective Redress in Antitrust (and how)? Journal of  European Competition Law 
& Practice 4 (2013), 3, 5, who refer, for the former alternative, to Cyprus, Denmark, Italy, 
Latvia, and for the latter alternative to Austria, Estonia, Finland, France, Lithuania, 
Portugal, and Spain. Germany and Sweden are listed as the only Member States that 
recognise a cross-border binding effect.
12 J. Bornkamm, in Langen and Bunte (eds.), Kartellrecht Kommentar Bd 1 – Deutsches Recht 
(Neuwied: Luchterhand, 12th ed. 2014) § 33 para. 171.
13 Ibid.
14 BGH, 12.7.2016, KZR 25/14 – Lottoblock II, juris, para. 18 et seq.
15 See Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 15/3640, 12.8.2004, Gesetzentwurf  der 
Bundesregierung, Entwurf  eines Siebten Gesetzes zur Änderung des Gesetzes gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, p. 54 (“Die Tatbestandswirkung bezieht sich allein auf  
die Feststellung eines Kartellrechtsverstoßes. Alle weiteren Fragen, insbesondere zur 
Schadenskausalität und zur Schadensbezifferung, unterliegen der freien Beweiswürdigung 
des Gerichts.”).
binding in a follow-on action.16 Yet, where a decision 
contains, for example, findings on the appropriate market 
definition, these findings are binding on a civil court, 
where a plaintiff  relies thereon to establish that certain 
categories of products or customers, etc. were affected 
by an infringement.17 There is, however, a diverging 
judgment by the Oberlandesgericht (Higher Regional 
Court) in Munich, which did not consider itself  bound by 
the market definition adopted by the Bundeskartellamt 
(Federal Cartel Office) in a decision to fine a firm because 
of vertical restraint of competition.18 The court adopted 
a different market definition, and thus denied standing 
to a firm that alleged to have sustained damage due 
to market foreclosure even though according to the 
Bundeskartellamt’s market definition the firm should 
have been regarded as an actor on the foreclosed market. 
9. Since the binding effect is limited to the establishment 
of an infringement of competition law, it does not include 
the establishment of fault in a fining decision. Therefore, 
the binding effect does not concern the establishment of 
fault as required for a damages claim pursuant to Section 
33a(1) of the German Competition Act. Nevertheless, the 
Oberlandesgericht (Higher Regional Court) in Karlsruhe 
has indeed assumed a binding effect in this regard.19
10. Ultimately, it will be for the ECJ to clarify remaining 
uncertainties as to the scope of the binding effect and what 
exactly the legal effect is which is described in Article 9(2) 
of the Directive as “prima facie evidence,” a notion that 
appears to be novel to a considerable number of Member 
States, but which in any case has to be fleshed out as an 
EU law concept. The Member States enjoy a certain 
discretion to expand the binding effect beyond what is 
required in Article 9 of the Directive. First of all, they 
may—like the German legislator—attribute a binding 
effect to decisions of “foreign” competition authorities. 
Moreover, decisions of competition authorities might be 
considered as binding also with regard to other elements 
of a damages claim such as, for example, fault20 or the 
establishment of harm and the calculation of damages, 
but also for actions not covered by the Directive such as 
actions for collective redress or actions for an injunction. 
While the text of Article 33b of the German Competition 
Act only refers to damages claims, it has been argued 
that it equally covers actions for an injunction if  the 
requirements of a damages action are met.21
16 OLG München, 21.2.2013, U 5006/11 Kart – Fernsehvermarktung, juris, para. 90.
17 See Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 18/10207, 07.11.2016, Gesetzentwurf  der 
Bundesregierung, Entwurf  eines Neunten Gesetzes zur Änderung des Gesetzes gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, p. 56 (“Von der Bindungswirkung erfasst sind die 
Feststellungen zu sämtlichen Tatbestandsmerkmalen, deren Verwirklichung den Verstoß 
begründet und zu denen die Behörde oder das Gericht in seiner Entscheidung Feststellungen 
getroffen hat. Dazu gehören insbesondere auch die räumliche und sachliche Marktabgrenzung 
sowie das zeitliche Ausmaß des Verstoßes, soweit die Entscheidung hierzu Feststellungen 
enthält” (references omitted)).
18 OLG München, 21.2.2013, U 5006/11 Kart – Fernsehvermarktung, juris, para. 101.
19 OLG Karlsruhe, 31.7.2013, 6 U 51/12 (Kart) – Feuerwehrfahrzeuge, juris, para. 46.
20 See Recital (11) of  the Directive.
21 See M. Kling and S. Thomas, Kartellrecht (München: Franz Vahlen, 2nd ed., 2016), 
pp. 853 et seq. Ce
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11. At the end of the day, the effet utile of the binding 
effect with regard to follow-on damages claims will, 
to a considerable extent, depend on the way national 
competition authorities substantiate and publish their 
decisions.22 A challenge in this regard seems to be the 
increasing number of settlement decisions. From the 
perspective of cartel victims it is crucial whether the 
decisions of national competition authorities are useful 
to demonstrate which products have been negatively 
affected23 or whether they reveal facts that are helpful 
to calculate damages.24 Certainly, the binding effect is 
restricted to the finding of an infringement and there is 
a considerable difference between the facts an authority 
needs in order to show an infringement and the facts a 
cartel victim needs in order to substantiate a damage 
claim. However, an authority may, to a greater or lesser 
extent, be ambitious in supporting potential plaintiffs by 
putting in a decision as precise and detailed information 
as possible about the affected sales, customers or the 
timeframe of the cartel infringement.
J.-U. F.
II. France
12. Article 9 of Directive 2014/104/EU of 29 November 
2014 relating to “Binding Effect of Competition 
Authorities’ Decisions” has been implemented into 
French law by Article L. 481-2 of the French Commercial 
Code (FCC) in the new title specifically created to gather 
most of the rules governing antitrust damages actions. 
The binding effect of competition authorities means that 
victims bring follow-on actions. It is a key provision in 
order to foster actions of damages in a field where it is 
highly difficult to prove the fault as a constitutive element 
of civil liability: access to evidence and cost clearly 
represent daunting challenges for victims. Recital  34 
explains the rationale of Article 9: avoiding inconsistency 
in the application of Articles  101 and 102 TFEU and 
increasing effectiveness and procedural efficiency of 
actions of damages. The high risks of a contradiction 
between decisions and judgments would undermine the 
credibility of this branch of law. Moreover, it would be 
a waste of public funding for a proper administration 
of justice. Binding effects are consequently regarded 
as a lesser evil. These arguments have been essential in 
France. They were sufficiently convincing to overcome 
a traditional obstacle: the independence of judges. 
The result is that we may consider that the provisions 
of Article  L.  481-1 of the French Commercial Code 
faithfully transpose the Directive. First, we need to clarify 
the notion of “final decision.” Second, the three kinds of 
requirements for binding effects are to be scrutinised.
22 Pursuant to Section 53(5) of  the German Competition Act, the Bundeskartellamt as 
a rule has to inform the public about a fining decision on its website. This notification 
should contain inter alia information on the facts of  the case, the type and timeframe of  
the infringement, the firms that participated in the infringement, the goods and services 
concerned. 
23 Cf. Article 17(2) of  the Directive.
24 See Article 17(1) of  the Directive.
1. Clarification about the 
notion of “final decision”
13. Article 9 of the EU Directive states “an infringement 
of competition law found by a final decision.” The terms 
“infringement found” leads to exclude commitment 
decisions. According to Article 9 of Council Regulation 
(EC) No. 1/2003, “such a decision (…) shall conclude that 
there are no longer grounds for action by the Commission.” 
An infringement is not at all established. Commitment 
decisions cannot have a binding effect. Article L. 481-2 
of the Commercial Code is even clearer than Article  9 
of the EU Directive. It specifies that the binding effect is 
subordinate to finding of existence, and the attribution to, 
a natural or legal person. A French court seems, however, 
to have gone beyond the EU Directive by admitting 
a fault whereas the practice had only been subject to a 
commitment decision. This isolated case has been widely 
noticed and commented upon.25 As a matter of fact, a 
victim bringing an individual action is not prevented 
from proving a fault without relying on a full recognition 
by a competition authority. It is different from a collective 
action, which must be a follow-on action according to 
Article 623-24 of the Consumer Code.26 Consequently, 
a court may be more easily convinced of the existence 
of a fault if  competition concerns are mentioned by a 
competition authority in a commitment decision. In 
this way, we can approve this isolated case. But it is not 
a binding effect in stricto sensu. By contrast, settlement 
decisions are involved in the binding effect of Article 9 
of the EU Directive, because the uncontested finding 
of the infringement is the condition of the downward 
adjustment.
14.  As for the term “final” which determines the 
“decision,” the French government distinguishes different 
points which are not mentioned in the directive. Bruno 
Lasserre, as former president of the French Competition 
Authority, was convinced that it was inappropriate to 
wait for a final decision when an appeal has been directed 
against the amount of fines and he raised that most 
appeals are exclusively against the setting of the fines. 
This line of reasoning had been already put forward 
during the debates relating to the collective action 
introduced into French law in 2014 by Act No. 2014-344 
25 A. Wachsmann and N.  Zacharie,  Engagements  : Le Tribunal de commerce de Paris 
reconnaît, au terme d’une motivation succincte, l’existence d’une faute à l’encontre 
de deux sociétés ayant bénéficié de la procédure d’engagements devant l’Autorité de 
la concurrence, et en déduit un préjudice pour le demandeur qu’il convient de réparer 
(DKT/Eco-Emballages et Valorplast), 30  March  2015, Concurrences No.  3-2015, Art. 
No. 75009, pp. 79-81  ; Ch. Lemaire, Dommages et intérêts  : Le Tribunal de commerce 
de Paris condamne des entreprises à payer des dommages et intérêts du fait de pratiques 
ayant donné lieu à une procédure d’engagements (DKT International/Eco-Emballages, 
Valorplast), 30 March 2015, Concurrences No. 3-2015, Art. No. 75116, pp. 154-156.
26 S.  Pietrini et L. Nicolas Vuillerme, Regards critiques sur l’action de groupe en droit 
de la concurrence, in L’intensification de la réparation des dommages issus des pratiques 
anticoncurrentielles, M.  Béhar-Touchais, D.  Bosco et C.  Prieto (eds.), IRJS Editions, 
2016, No. 38. Ce
 d
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on Consumer Affairs27. Finally, it was the basis for 
Article  L.  623-24 of the Consumer Code. Transposing 
the Directive  2014/104/EU, the French government 
thought that it was appropriate to align Article L. 481-2 
of the Commercial Code with Article 623-24 of the 
Consumer Code and to give the same treatment to 
parties injured by anticompetitive practices.28 However 
the wording of Article L. 481-2 of the Commercial Code 
is more accurate than Article L. 623-24, which only refers 
to “infringement.” According to Article L. 481-2 of the 
Commercial Code, the existence of an anticompetitive 
practice is to be presumed, as well as the attribution to a 
natural or legal person. 
15. The only real problem with the term “final” comes from 
the reference to “ordinary appeals” which is introduced by 
Article L. 481-2 of the Commercial Code whereas Article 
623-24 of the Consumer Code simply refers to “appeal.” 
Thus, the French government distinguishes between 
ordinary and extraordinary appeals. In our context a 
final decision is a decision which is no longer subject to 
ordinary forms of review. It is difficult to understand 
that decisions subject to an appeal before the French 
Cour de cassation (French Supreme Court for judicial 
matters), i.e., an extraordinary appeal, will be considered 
as having a binding effect on French courts dealing 
with damages actions. We must emphasise that the 
participation in the infringement may be discussed as a 
point of law and therefore appeal may be brought before 
the Cour de cassation. The French Supreme Court may 
reverse a decision on this particular point as has been 
demonstrated in the case of the cartel between German 
and French millers. Consequently, it seems inappropriate 
to have used the term “ordinary.”
16.  Aside from this regret, the French transposition 
should be approved because it goes beyond the Directive 
in a way that could facilitate injured parties’ proof and 
accelerate their actions for damages. 
2. Requirements for binding 
effect
17.  The French government refers to three kinds of 
binding effects: the binding effect within the Member 
State of the national authority; the binding effect 
in another Member State; the binding effect of EU 
Commission’s decisions.
27 Article L.  623-24, Code de la consommation  : “Lorsque les manquements reprochés 
au professionnel portent sur le respect des règles définies au titre II du livre IV du code de 
commerce ou des articles 101 et 102 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne, la 
responsabilité du professionnel ne peut être prononcée dans le cadre de l’action mentionnée à 
l’article L. 623-1 que sur le fondement d’une décision prononcée à l’encontre du professionnel 
par les autorités ou juridictions nationales ou de l’Union européenne compétentes, qui 
constate les manquements et qui n’est plus susceptible de recours pour la partie relative à 
l’établissement des manquements.”
28 Rapport au Président de la République relatif  à l’ordonnance no 2017-303 du 9 mars 2017 
relative aux actions en dommages et intérêts du fait des pratiques anticoncurrentielles, 
Légifrance.
2.1 The binding effect within 
the Member State 
18. According to some opinions, it would be necessary to 
discuss the scope of authority of the French Competition 
Authority’s decision when compared to the force of res 
judicata. It has been argued that only the operative 
part of a judgment of the court possesses the force of 
res judicata. This analysis has not been retained for two 
reasons. First, it was depriving the binding effect of the 
possibility of obtaining useful information for the proof 
of harm and causality. Second, Recital 34 should not be 
misinterpreted: its limitation was in fact an enlargement. 
It provides “the effect of finding should cover only the 
nature of the infringement and its material, personal, 
temporal and territorial scope.” The scope of the binding 
effect is consequently large. No further discussion was 
pursued on the issue. We can admit that the notion of 
binding effect according to Article  9 of the Directive 
should not refer to res judicata according to national law, 
but is an autonomous notion of EU law.29 We can also 
emphasise that a similar binding effect has been already 
introduced in Article L. 623-24 by Act No. 2014-344 on 
Consumer Affairs, because collective actions can only be 
follow-on actions. The Act, called “Loi Hamon” (Hamon 
Act), set a precedent for binding effect. Transposition 
of Article  9 of the EU Directive into French law 
has been thus facilitated by Article L.  623-24 of the 
French Consumer Code. Article L.  481-2 refers to an 
infringement “deemed to be irrefutably established” in the 
same words as Article 9 of the EU Directive.
2.2 The binding effects on actions 
for damages in other Member States
19.  Article  9, paragraph  2, of the EU Directive 
provides that a final decision taken in another Member 
State may be presented before national courts as “at least 
prima facie evidence.” Opposition must have been very 
strong against an irrebuttable presumption of fault. 
Some views about disparities in procedure guarantees still 
prevail in certain Member States and they are not willing 
to give substantial weight to infringement decisions in a 
sort of mutual recognition.30 
20. However, the phrase “at least” indicates a potentiality. 
The French government could have chosen to treat all 
national competition authorities on an equal footing 
before French courts. It has already chosen such a 
solution for collective actions in Article L.  623-24 of 
the Consumer Code. In the preparatory work for the 
Hamon Act, German solution was put forward as a 
29 R. Amaro and M. J. Azar-Baud, L’effet des décisions des autorités de concurrence devant 
les juridictions nationales, in L’intensification de la réparation des dommages issus des 
pratiques anticoncurrentielles, supra n. 24, at 95. 
30 F. Wagner-von Papp, La transposition de la directive 2014/104/UE relative aux actions 
en dommages et intérêts pour violation du droit des pratiques anticoncurrentielles, 
May 2015, Concurrences No. 2-2015, Art. No. 72302, p. 11. Ce
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model for EU integration.31 The equal treatment of all 
competition authorities is consistent with the proper 
functioning of the European Competition Network. 
However, this Article L. 623-24 has been changed. From 
now on it just mentions “national competition authorities 
and courts.” It reveals a backward step in order to align 
this Article with a new rule in Article L.  481-2 of the 
Commercial Code. The French government finally chose 
the minimalist solution proposed by Article  9 of the 
EU Directive instead of clinging to its forward-thinking 
and integrationist solution by which the decisions from 
any competition authority in European Union could 
benefit from the binding effect on French courts. We can 
only regret that the initial approach sustaining Article 
L. 623-24 of the Consumer Code was finally not adopted 
for the Article L. 481-2 of the Commercial Code. 
21.  As for the phrase “prima facie,” some hesitated 
between a beginning of proof and even a rebuttable 
evidence. Finally, the Latin phrase is transposed into a 
plain wording: “a means of proof.” Recital 35 inspired this 
solution: “(…) the finding can be assessed as appropriate, 
along with any other evidence adduced by the parties.”
22. We can conclude that Article L. 481 is in accordance 
with Article  9, which introduces a special rule for 
competition authorities’ decisions from other Member 
States. 
2.3 Binding effect of the EU 
Commission’s decisions
23.  The French government felt it necessary to devote 
a third paragraph to the value of the EU Commission’s 
decision. It is a source of astonishment because the point 
is already clearly stated. Article  16 of Regulation (EC) 
No.  1/2003 provides that national courts cannot take 
decisions running counter to the decision adopted by 
Commission when they rule on agreements or practices 
under Articles  101 and 102 TFUE.32 Article L.  481-2 
of the Commercial Code just repeat the wording of 
Article 16 of the Regulation. The only advantage of this 
repetition is to set out within one legal text all the rules 
about the value of evidence for decisions coming from all 
competition authorities. 
C. P.
31 B. Becker, L’effet contraignant des décisions des autorités de concurrence pour les actions 
privées en droit allemand et européen, in L’intensification de la réparation des dommages 
issus des pratiques anticoncurrentielles, supra n. 24, at 129.
32 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of  16 December 2002 on the implementation of  the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of  the Treaty, Article 16 – Uniform 
application of  Community competition law: “1. When national courts rule on agreements, 
decisions or practices under Article  81 or Article  82 of  the Treaty which are already the 
subject of  a Commission decision, they cannot take decisions running counter to the decision 
adopted by the Commission. They must also avoid giving decisions which would conflict with 
a decision contemplated by the Commission in proceedings it has initiated. To that effect, the 
national court may assess whether it is necessary to stay its proceedings. This obligation is 
without prejudice to the rights and obligations under Article 234 of  the Treaty.”
III. Italy
24. Before the implementation of the Directive 2014/104, 
infringement decisions issued by the Italian Competition 
Authority (ICA) were not binding on civil courts. 
Nevertheless, civil courts have always considered those 
decisions as highly reliable evidence, i.e., in the words 
of a landmark judgment of the Corte di cassazione, 
“prova privilegiata.”33 This is, strictly speaking, a notion 
unknown to the Italian Code of Civil Procedure, but 
it is clear that it means something more than merely 
admissible evidence subject to judicial free appreciation 
and at the same time something less than conclusive 
evidence, owing to the fact that the defendant could 
theoretically adduce evidence in rebuttal.34 It could be 
said that in the current state of the case law the evidentiary 
value of ICA’s findings comes close to a rebuttable 
presumption of the existence of the infringement. 
Actually, civil courts have never departed from ICA’s 
findings; furthermore, over time, courts have severely 
restricted the defendant’s power to adduce evidence in 
rebuttal. Following settled case law, the defendant can 
try to persuade the court that the findings in the ICA’s 
decision are not reliable, provided that the defendant 
brings fresh evidence or new arguments on points of law. 
In other words, legal arguments and evidence adduced by 
the defendant cannot be identical to those, which have 
been already dismissed as immaterial or unfounded in the 
administrative proceedings before the ICA.35 With regard 
to the scope of the very high probative value of ICA’s 
decision, courts have developed a twofold standard. 
On the one hand, in actions relating to the “Car Insurance 
cartel,”36 courts have followed a broader approach, and 
they have also attributed to ICA’s assessments, made in 
the grounds of the decisions, high evidential value with 
regard to the issues of causation and of the existence and 
calculation of damages suffered by individual consumers. 
As a result, the insured asking for compensation satisfies 
the burden of proof, both with regard to the existence 
of the infringement and with regard to the existence of 
damages, simply by adducing the ICA’s decision and the 
insurance contract.37 On the other hand, when dealing 
with cases of abuse of dominance, courts have followed 
a far more restrictive approach, maintaining that ICA’s 
decisions enjoy high evidential value only with regard 
to the finding of infringement. Courts have thus drawn 
a distinction between price-fixing cartels and abusive 
exploitation of dominance. In the latter cases, they 
have constantly held that the special value of the ICA’s 
33 Corte di cassazione, civ., 13.2.2009, No. 3640.
34 Corte di cassazione, civ., 28.5.2014, No. 11904.
35 Corte di cassazione, civ., 23.4.2014, No. 9116; Tribunale Milano, 25.6.2016, No. 6666
36 Follow-on damages actions based on ICA’s decision n. 8546/2000. In the grounds of  the 
decision, ICA stated, i.a., that the unlawful conduct actually had an impact on prices.
37 Courts also require that rebuttal evidence, as to causation, has to do with exceptional 
circumstances relating to the defendant undertaking and not to the general conditions of  
the market: Cass., 6.5.2015, No. 9131. Ce
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decision is limited to findings pertaining to the dominant 
position of the defendant company on the market and to 
the qualification of its conduct as abusive.38 
25.  Article  7.1 of the Decree fully implements Article 
9 of the Directive, though it does so with some slightly 
restrictive clarifications inspired by the Directive’s 
Recitals. In damages actions, ICA’s final decisions are now 
formally binding on civil judges and no rebuttal evidence 
is admitted. In full compliance with the Directive, only 
final decisions or final judgments finding an infringement 
are binding. Article 7.1 of the Decree dispels any doubt 
and clarifies that ICA’s decision is binding both when it 
becomes final due to confirmation by the review court 
and when it becomes final because appeal was not lodged 
in due time.39 With regard to the nature of this binding 
effect, little help comes from the wording of Article  7, 
which echoes Article 9 of the Directive. The Report is not 
unambiguous on the point, though it seemingly inclines 
towards the characterisation as conclusive evidence.40 
Anyway, the most interesting question is whether the 
claimant, in the civil proceedings, is prevented from 
adducing evidence that the anticompetitive agreement 
had a longer duration or that there are also other 
accomplices. It has to be borne in mind that the binding 
effect of national decisions is limited to decisions finding 
an infringement so that it only operates in favour of the 
victim. This is all the more convincing if  one considers 
that the victim of the infringements, as a rule, does not 
take part in the proceedings before the ICA and therefore 
shall not be subject to adverse effects deriving from the 
administrative decision.41 
Article  7 only mentions claims for compensation, 
also pursuant to Article 140 bis Legislative Decree 
No.  206/2005, i.e., the so-called consumers’ “class 
action.” The question of whether the decision is binding 
even with regard to different actions, such as claims for 
declaratory relief, injunction or nullity, has been left to 
the assessment of the courts. An affirmative answer is 
likely if  one takes the view that the rationale behind the 
binding effect is mainly the easing of the injured party’s 
burden of proof, besides achieving proper coordination 
between public and private enforcement. In any event, it 
is likely that courts, when dealing with different claims, 
will attribute to ICA’s decisions at least a very high 
evidentiary value, as they used to do in the past.
26. Commenting on the Directive and the White Book, 
many scholars have raised serious doubts about the 
consistency of the binding effect of national CA’s 
38 Tribunale Milano, 9.11.2015, No. 12519; Tribunale Milano, 4.3.2014, No. 3054; Cass., 
10.9.2013, No. 20605. 
39 Albeit the law is silent on the issue, it is arguable that CA’s decisions finding an infringement 
are also binding when the appeal is only directed against the amount of  fines (Siragusa, 
Concorrenza e mercato, 2014/2, 311)
40 The nature of  the “binding effect” is discussed, i.a., by: Vincre, Rivista diritto processuale, 
4-5/2015, 1160; De Santis, Rivista diritto processuale, 6/2015, 1510; De Cristofaro, 
AIDA, 1/2015, 118; Negri, Int’l Lis, 2009, 136. Some practical effects of  the alternative 
reference to the notion of  res judicata are outlined by: Tavassi, in L’impatto della nuova 
direttiva 104/2014 sul Private Antitrust Enforcement, Munari (ed.), Roma, 2016, 64. 
41 See Chieppa, Diritto industriale, 4/2016, 318.
decision with Article  24.2 and Article  101.2 of the 
Italian Constitution, Article  6 ECHR and Article  47 
European Charter of Fundamental Rights.42 The issue 
has given rise in the past to a heated debate.43 In the end, 
the prevailing, though not undisputed, opinion is that 
binding effect can only be tolerated, provided that the 
decision can be challenged before a court which enjoys 
“full jurisdiction.”44
In order to overcome perplexities, that are still alive after 
the ECtHR Menarini judgment45 and that are principally 
due to the uneven court practice and high case-by-case 
variability in the intensity of the scrutiny,46 the Decree 
has tried to restate the standard of judicial review of 
ICA’s decision. It has done so by adding to Article 7.1 
a long sentence stating that the administrative courts 
fully review the facts upon which the challenged decision 
is grounded and that they can also control technical 
assessments which are not characterised by a substantial 
margin of appreciation (oggettivo margine di opinabilità). 
The Report tries to reassure the sceptics that “effective 
judicial review is guaranteed by Art. 7.1, second sentence.” 
Unfortunately, the wording of the provision is far from 
adequate for the objective, and it is rather likely that it 
will rekindle the eternal debate on the adequacy of the 
judicial review of ICA’s decisions. Article  7.1, second 
sentence, seemingly suggests that complex economic 
assessments, which are at the core of competition law 
enforcement, are not subject to full review or even to 
direct control.47 To dispel doubts that it violates the right 
to effective judicial review, Article 7.1 is therefore to be 
construed in a way consistent with the standard of full 
jurisdiction established in the Menarini judgment.48
When ICA’s decision is final because it has not been 
challenged, doubts about consistency of the binding 
effect with judicial independence and the standard of fair 
trial are all the more strong, though in practice the case is 
merely hypothetical since prohibition decision are almost 
always challenged. In the Report, it is suggested that, 
to avoid inconsistency with Article 101.2 of the Italian 
Constitution, Article 7.1 should be construed in the sense 
that civil courts can “refuse to apply” the ICA’s decision 
in exceptional cases and precisely when they find that 
the decision is “manifestly illegal.” The suggestion has 
not been codified into law and the actual practicability 
thereof is entirely left to the evaluation of the courts.49 
42 Giussani, AIDA, 1/2015, 253; De Santis, 1510.
43 Cf. Fabbio, Concorrenza e mercato, 2013, 193; Negri, Int’l Lis, 2/2014, 72.
44 Ex multis: Villa, 445; Pasquarelli, Diritto industriale, 3/2016, 252; Panzani, Italian 
Antitrust Review, 2/2015, 102. 
45 ECtHR, 27.12.2011, No. 43509/08, Menarini Diagnostics v. Italia. Italian courts recently 
reaffirmed the adequacy of  the current standard of  judicial review: Cassazione  civ., 
Sezioni Unite, 20.1.2014, No. 1013; Consiglio di Stato, 6.5.2014, No. 2302.
46 See Judicial Review of  Antitrust Decisions: Q&A, Italian Antitrust Review, 1/2015, 144, 
reporting opinions of  several experts; Muscolo, in L’applicazione del diritto della concorrenza 
in Italia e in Europa, Benacchio-Carpagnano (ed.), 2015, Trento, 14; Torchia, Mercato 
Concorrenza e Regole, 2014, 501; Siragusa-Rizza, Giurisprudenza commerciale, 2/2013, 408.
47 Villa, Corriere Giuridico, 4/2017, 446.
48 See Caiazzo, Italian Antitrust Review, 2/2017, 112.
49 Caiazzo, 114. See also Fabbio, 213. Ce
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27. Article 7.1 of the Decree specifies that ICA’s decision 
finding an infringement is only binding on the infringer, 
i.e., on the addressee named in the operative part of the 
prohibition decision. It is undisputed that the injured 
party can always take advantage of the binding effect 
of the decision, immaterial whether it had or had not 
participated in the administrative proceedings. As 
to the material scope, Article  7 codifies into law the 
words of Recital 34 of the Directive. Accordingly, only 
the operative part of the decision, where the finding 
of infringement is stated, is binding in subsequent 
damages actions; mere findings of facts in the grounds 
of the decision are not binding unless they are integral 
and directly relevant to the finding of infringement. 
It follows that, as a rule, the issues of causation and 
the existence and amount of damages are not covered. 
If, as it usually happens, considerations on effects and 
damages have been inserted into the grounds of the 
decision merely to draw attention to the possibility of 
claiming compensation, it is undisputed that they fall 
outside the scope of the binding effect. If, instead, the 
ICA’s decision has deemed the conduct to be illegal not 
by object but only “by effect,” then it is arguable that “the 
determination of effect made by the NCA is part of the 
constitutive elements of the infringement, and therefore 
could be deemed within the scope of the binding effect.”50 
The restrictive approach followed by the Decree helps to 
overcome the concerns about the compression of judicial 
independence, and it is basically in line with previous case 
law, except for cartels. As a matter of fact, previous case 
law on damages claims based on cartels went perhaps 
too far, relying on CA’s decision as “prova privilegiata” 
not only with regard to the existence of the infringement 
but also with regard to the effects on the market and, 
indirectly, the existence and calculation of individual 
damages. The binding effect has a narrower scope. As 
for cartels, the practical outcome will not be excessively 
different, by virtue of the rebuttable presumption of the 
existence of damages under Article 14. 2 of the Decree. 
Of course, outside the scope of the binding effect, ICA’s 
decision can still enjoy evidentiary value. It remains to 
be seen whether this evidentiary value will be as strong 
as it used to be (see above). In any event, limiting the 
admissible rebuttal evidence is now out of the question; 
so the point is whether national decisions are prima facie 
evidence as to the issues of causation and of damages. 
Judging from the wording of Article 7.1, it is clear that 
only decisions finding an infringement are binding; 
no other ways of closing of the file are considered. It 
follows also that administrative courts’ judgments which 
set aside the decision are not binding on civil courts. 
With regard to commitment decisions (Art. 14 ter L. 
No. 287/90), courts had already reached the conclusion 
that commitment decisions were not “prova privilegiata.” 
Such decisions, though, can be considered at least 
circumstantial evidence and be assessed along with other 
50 Siragusa, 306. With regard to culpability, see Siragusa, IAR, 2/2015, 105. The A. suggests 
that findings of  intention or negligence made by the CA usually fall outside the scope of  
the binding effect. In any event, in the field of  unfair competition, Art. 2600 Civil Code 
sets up a rebuttable presumption of  fault; it is generally accepted that the provision can be 
applied by analogy.
evidence, especially the statement of the objections and 
infringement decision against undertakings that did not 
submit commitments.51
28.  Concerning cross-border effects of decisions issued 
abroad, the Italian transposition has followed a restrictive 
approach. Albeit the Directive allowed Member States to 
recognise the full-binding effect also of final decisions of 
the CAs of other Member States, not surprisingly Italy 
has not made use of that option. The Italian lawmaker 
has not even used the phrase “prima face evidence,” with 
which the Directive tries to describe the cross-border 
probative value. Presumably, the reason is that the notion 
has no real correspondence in the Italian law of evidence; 
hence the different opinions of scholars commenting 
on the Directive.52 The Decree appears to follow the 
more restrictive opinions, since Article  7.2 reads: “(…) 
evidence to be assessed along with other evidence.” At 
first sight, the expression refers to evidence subject to 
judicial free appreciation under Article  116.1 Code of 
Civil Procedure. At the same time, pursuant to Article 
7.2 the evidentiary value of foreign NCA’s decisions has 
the same personal and material limits as the binding 
effect of Italian CA’s decisions. These boundaries are 
perfectly understandable if  the foreign decision gives 
rise to a rebuttable presumption. If  this is not the case, 
Article 7.2 inevitably leads one to wonder what kind of 
probative value, if  any, foreign NCA’s decisions enjoy 
outside those personal and material boundaries. In my 
opinion, if  Article 7.2 is construed in a way that leaves the 
judge completely free to appreciate the probative value of 
the foreign decision, then it can be argued that it is not 
entirely consistent with the Directive’s objective. It is true 
that Article 7.2 partly echoes Recital 3553; yet, the belated 
compromise reached in the final text of the Directive 
clearly aimed at allowing national judges to attach at 
least a very high evidential value to foreign decisions.54 
Accordingly, Article 7.2 should be construed as referring 
to evidence per se sufficient to prove the infringement, 
unless proven otherwise. Of course, in the light of the 
rationale behind Article  9.2 of the Directive, courts 
would not be allowed to limit the admissible evidence in 
rebuttal, as they used to do under the so-called “prova 
privilegiata” doctrine. 
M. N.
51 Tribunale Milano, 28.7.2015, BT Italia. 
52 Rebuttable presumption according to: Pasquarelli, 263; simple means of  proof  according 
to: Chieppa, 318. 
53 In Recital 35 the finding of  infringement in NCA’s decisions is considered at least prima 
facie evidence and at the same time as evidence that “can be assessed as appropriate, along 
with any other evidence adduced by the parties.” Actually, the latter phrase simply clarifies 
that the judge has to take into account rebuttal evidence.
54 Haasbeeck, in L’applicazione del diritto della concorrenza in Italia e in Europa, Benacchio-
Carpagnano (ed.), 2015, Trento, 79; Nazzini, Italian Antitrust Review, 2/2015, 91. Ce
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IV. Netherlands
1. Decision of the Dutch NCA
29.  Under Article  161a Code of Civil Procedure, an 
unassailable decision of the ACM, the Dutch NCA, is 
irrefutable proof of the infringement that the ACM 
established in proceedings for the compensation of 
damages as a result of an infringement of competition 
law. An “infringement of competition law” is, in this 
context also, an infringement of European competition 
law or national competition law that is applied in parallel 
to the application of Articles  101 and 102 TFEU.55 
“Compensation of damages” must be interpreted 
broadly. The compensation may also be in the form of 
set off, for example, if  the defendant has a claim against 
the claimant.56 This provision implements Article 9, 
paragraph 1, Directive. 
2. Decisions of other NCAs
30.  Article  9, paragraph  2, Directive has not been 
implemented, at least not with a new provision. The 
Netherlands has what is called a “free evidence doctrine” 
(vrije bewijsleer). Article 152, paragraph 1, Code of Civil 
Procedure provides that evidence may be given with “all 
means.” It is left to the court to determine the evidentiary 
value of the evidence.57 Therefore, the courts already 
have the possibility to accept a final decision of an 
NCA of another Member State as prima facie evidence 
of the infringement.58 That is congruent with Article 9, 
paragraph 2, Directive that requires no more than that 
the decision of an NCA of another Member State may 
be presented as prima facie evidence.
F. K.
V. United Kingdom 
31. Prior to the Damages Directive, courts in the UK, of 
course, had to give effect to Article 16 of Regulation (EC) 
No. 1/2003 where decisions by the European Commission 
were concerned. In addition, OFT/CMA decisions (and 
court decisions upholding such infringement decisions) 
have two separate effects. 
32. First, infringement decisions may be used as a basis 
for follow-on actions. Sections  47A and 58A(2) of the 
Competition Act 1998 (in the form given to it under the 
Consumer Rights Act 2015) make final infringement 
decisions binding on the court and the tribunal. 
55 Art. 6:193k, sub a, Civil Code.
56 Explanatory Memorandum, p. 22.
57 Art. 152, para. 2, Code of  Civil Procedure.
58 See also Explanatory Memorandum, p. 8.
Infringement decisions in this provision are, pursuant to 
section 47A(6) of the Competition Act 1998, decisions by 
the CMA on the Chapter I and Chapter II prohibitions or 
Articles 101, 102 TFEU, tribunal decisions that uphold 
such decisions on appeal, and Commission decisions on 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.
33.  Second, section  58 of the Competition Act  1998 
provides that findings of fact by the CMA are binding 
on the court or tribunal, unless the court or tribunal 
directs otherwise. This goes beyond the binding effect 
in follow-on actions, and in one sense even beyond 
the German provision in §  33(4) ARC  2005/§  33b 
ARC 2017, as it does not only relate to the finding of an 
infringement, but any finding of fact. The question under 
what conditions a finding of fact is binding and when 
the court or tribunal should direct otherwise is not yet 
completely settled. In Enron, the court of appeal stated 
that “the regulator may make findings which are directly 
relevant to a decision as to infringement, but it may also 
make findings of much less direct relevance. Findings in 
the former category should be regarded as binding, because 
to challenge them would be tantamount to challenging 
the finding of infringement. However, if the finding is 
peripheral or incidental, on the one hand, to question it may 
not involve subverting the infringement finding and on the 
other it may be fair and sensible because the undertaking 
may not have been concerned, for the purposes of the 
regulatory proceedings, to contest such a point, whereas if 
the finding is relied on in proceedings for damages it may 
have a much greater importance.”59 In Gibson v. Pride 
Mobility, the OFT had in its infringement decision made 
a finding that the agreements and concerted practices in 
question had a “not-insignificant” impact on competition 
for mobility scooters. Defendants argued that this was 
not a finding of fact, and if  it were, it would be one which 
was only “peripheral or incidental,” and that the CAT 
should direct otherwise. The CAT did not, at this stage, 
rule on whether or not to direct otherwise, but noted that 
“whether or not binding, it is nonetheless very relevant that 
the OFT reached the view, after a lengthy investigation, 
that the infringement had such an effect.”60
34.  Prior to the implementation of the Damages 
Directive in the 2017 Regulations, foreign NCA decisions 
(or decisions of courts acting as competition authorities 
or as appeals courts) had no binding effect on UK courts. 
35. Implementing Article 9(2) of the Damages Directive, 
paragraph  35(1) of the new Schedule 8A to the 
Competition Act 1998 now provides that “[f]or purposes 
of competition proceedings, a final decision of a member 
State competition authority or review court that there has 
been an infringement of Article 101(1) or Article 102 by an 
undertaking is prima facie evidence of the infringement.” 
Just as under Article 9(2) of the Damages Directive, it is 
not entirely clear what evidence would be necessary and/
or sufficient to rebut the evidence.
59 Enron Coal Services Ltd v. English, Welsh & Scottish Railway [2011] EWCA Civ 2 [50], 
quoted in Dorothy Gibson v. Pride Mobility Products Ltd [2017] CAT 9 [117], sub a.
60 Dorothy Gibson v. Pride Mobility Products Ltd [2017] CAT 9 [117] sub b. Ce
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36. The informally so-called “Great Repeal Bill” (that is, 
the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, introduced on 13 
July 201761) will demote the mandatory effect of Article 
16 of Regulation (EC) NO. 1/2003, and the prima facie 
effect from Article 9(2) of the Damages Directive, to a 
mere option for courts to have regard to Commission 
and Court decisions. According to its clause 6, a court 
or tribunal “is not bound by any principles laid down, or 
any decisions made, on or after exit day by the European 
Court” and “need not have regard to anything done on or 
 
61 The text of  the Bill can be accessed and the progress of  the Bill can be tracked at http://
services.parliament.uk/bills/2017-19/europeanunionwithdrawal/documents.html.
after exit day by the European Court, another EU entity 
or the EU but may do so if it considers it appropriate 
to do so”.62 Therefore, while follow-on actions based 
on decisions rendered before exit day would appear to 
continue for an interim period, follow-on actions in the 
UK will eventually become markedly less attractive, as 
they can only be based on CMA decisions, which will 
generally be confined to establishing harm within the 
UK.63
F. W.-v. P. n
62 Clause 6 of  the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. The Bill and its progress can be 
accessed at http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2017-19/europeanunionwithdrawal/
documents.html.
63 Sir Peter Roth, Competition law and Brexit: the challenges ahead, Competition Law 
Journal 2017, 5, 10. Ce
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